[iDC] Play and Counterpower
Sal Randolph
salrandolph at gmail.com
Sat Jun 20 20:40:43 UTC 2009
Greetings IDC friends,
In the breath between act I and act II, I'd like to take up the thread
on play, labor, and playbour that's been batted around here,
especially by Brian, Pat, and Julian. Just catching up and keeping up
with this whole discussion has been quite a playbour.
So...
While we're invoking Sutton-Smith, here's another bit of his regarding
some of the political consequences of play.
"The selling of sports...although it often resulted in the direct
ludic identity of the imperial sports teams, also led the colonials or
Third World people to adopt the rhetoric of game superiority (called
winning) that went with playing those sports; in the long run they
sometimes successfully contested their overlords for that same glory.
It is another paradox that the British imperial powers should use
contestive games to sell their own rhetoric identity of moral
gentlemanliness when they were also, less wittingly, selling the game
notion of legitimate opposition."
He goes on:
"Perhaps it can be said that whenever one is taught and beaten at
games by another group—whoever they are, masters, aliens, foreigners,
adults, gangs, or the opposite sex—one’s own group frequently develops
a desire to contest that superiority on the same playing field. This
opposition is a public transcript widely shared by the world’s
underdogs, and indeed it is a breach in the hegemony of the dominant
groups, even though the playing of the same games is itself consistent
with such hegemony (Scott, 1990). Many authors have seen the selling
of sports as a facet of the extension of imperial hegemony or the
capitalist way of life, work, and consumption. The problem is that the
same imperial way of life in some places permitted different social
classes or ethnic groups to compete for hegemony at least within the
ludic sphere. And such participation is at the very least a form of
enactive subjunctivity, with all its implied optimism and fantasies
about the possibility of success." (also from The Ambiguity of Play)
Here play is seen to have consequences other than those intended and
also to be a kind of reservoir of counterpower. Although the kind of
example he gives is specific and limited (the story he tells in this
section is primarily about cricket and rugby in the British colonies),
it's my feeling that both these qualities are always inherent or
latent in the very notion of play.
In the conversation we've had so far about play we've seen allusions
to a good play, or a play we like, which is subversive and a bad play,
a play we're suspicious of, which is selfish and distracting and
easily co-opted or exploited.
One thing that strikes me is that from the outside it's very difficult
to tell the two apart (and this may be one of the things that gives
play some political potency -- they way play resists surveillance of
its *meaning* in particular). People suffer from internal regimes
that are opressive and repressive as well as external ones. Think of
Deleuze and the Society of Control here. Or the subtle systems that
make forms of self-control both voluntary and desirable which Brian
ties back to Schiller's aesthetic state.
But as compelling as Brian's case is, for the idea of free play as
just another regime, I'm going to argue the opposite. What if, for
instance, Schiller was actually just wrong about play. What if there
is something about play that opposes regulation, both internal and
external? Something that tends (not all the time of course) to throw
a shoe in the works of the machine?
Play, for instance, is all about unknown outcomes - if it can be
completely predicted, it's not play. There's a reason factory workers
aren't encouraged to play with what they are making (though a little
joking might be allowed) - in the fordist factory every part and every
action must be known in advance. In this kind of environment any kind
of play equals sabotage.
Play can't be coerced (again, it becomes not-play), a quality that
even by itself is pretty interesting. It means that as long as play
exists there's a sphere of the uncoerced. Personally, this is one of
the aspects of play that makes it so compelling, worth defending time
and space for in my daily life.
Playing with tools changes their use, sometimes very simply as when
you use a shoe as a hammer. But even a simple transformation like
that implies a rethinking of the structures of expectation and social
meaning -- from there it's a short leap to more profound
reappropriations.
Pat mentions play's darker side (peeking into the Marquis de Sade's
bedroom), its essential amorality. But it strikes me that play
wouldn't be interesting (wouldn't make anything happen) without that
darker side. It's the amorality that allows for the return of the
repressed, the thinking of the unthinkable, a reserve of opposition or
counterpower in every situation. Meaning that this aspect of play is
genuinely something to be scared of, but also that it's what might
allow us to play our way out of systems of control. Especially
internal systems of control.
So on the one hand you have the Schillerian idea brought up by Brian
that play and aesthetic play help further regulate people and
society. But on the other you have the idea that play, precisely
because of its elements of amorality and unpredictability always
contains the seeds of an opposition to whatever the dominant systems
are. From this point of view play isn't utopian; play is in fact what
unmakes all utopias.
I haven't really gotten to playbour yet, but I'm going to stop and
post this before I fall too far behind the conversation.
-- Sal
More information about the iDC
mailing list